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REDUCTION:  SOME CRITERIA  AND CRIT IC ISMS 
OF  THE STRUCTURAL IST  CONCEPT*  
PROLOGUE 
Once upon a time there was a concept of reduction that was of a 
miraculous clarity. It was advocated by Nagel (1949, 1961) and 
Hempel (1965, 1966) and it said that a theory T' is reducible to 
another theory T if and only if there are conditions of application and 
"bridge principles" collected in a set of sentences A such that 
(d) T, A k T'. 
Since the bridge principles sometimes were called definitions (of 
T'-terms in the language of T) and since "k" of course signifies the 
relation of derivability between sets of sentences, we shall call this 
idea the d-concept. Deplorably, those happy days are gone. The party 
most guilty of this sad state of affairs is Feyerabend, who made out two 
more dogmas of empiricism presupposed by the d-concept of reduc- 
tion, viz., the consistency condition and the condition of meaning 
invariance (cf. Feyerabend 1962, pp. 43f and 1963, p. 10). The bloom 
of structuralism in the philosophy of science during the last 15 years 
may be regarded as a reaction to the challenge of the second of these 
conditions questioning the comparability or commensurability of 
scientific theories. The problem of shifts in the meaning of scientific 
expressions was circumvented by renouncing the explicit description 
of the languages of scientific theories. 
The structuralist turn caused by Sneed was very effective in so far as 
the notion of reduction has been discussed - at least in West Germany 
- almost exclusively in a structuralist setting since the mid-seventies. 
The gap to the traditional statement view in the philosophy of science, 
however, is easily bridged. Adams (1959), the pioneer of the struc- 
turalist concept of reduction, explicitly wants to satisfy the adequacy 
conditions of the d-concept, and the translatability of statement and 
non-statement views goes much further than has sometimes been 
supposed. ~The following, therefore, may also interest a convinced 
non-structuralist. Let me emphasize in advance that the present paper 
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is restricted to the problems of strict reduction and leaves aside those 
of approximations. 
The structuralist view of the dynamics of scientific theories has been 
subject to criticism in quite regular intervals. It seems to me, that 
Mayr (1976), Tuomela (1978), Niiniluoto (198()), Pearce (1982), 
Hoering (1984), Kamlah (1985), and Mormann (1984) are of special 
significance. The presentations of the structuralists as well as of their 
critics both have the drawback that practically every essay introduces 
new notations and minor changes of the definitions. Thus the reader -  
if not the author -  runs Ihe risk of losing sight of the continuity of 
discussion. In the following 1 shall try to show how the scattered 
criteria and criticisms of the structuralist concept of reduction arc to 
be evaluated in their context by using a uniform notation and sim- 
plified definitions. The simplifying assumptions are essentially intended 
to avoid the intricate devices introduced by Sneed for his inter- 
pretation of theoretical terms. Even though the supplementation of
these devices to the following definitions poses no essential problems it 
would make the immediate understanding more difficult. I will - like 
e.g. Kamlah - go back to the old Adamsian proposal and - neglecting 
theoretical terms and constraints - take a theory to be an ordered 
couple (M, I), where M is the class of models of T and I the class of 
its intended applications. M and 1 are always meant to be nonempty 
classes of structures of the same similarity type r, and the class Mp of 
potential models of T is simply to be identified with the class of all 
structures of type r (modulo a suitable logic L). e 
Now let T = (M, I) and T'  = (M', I') be two theories. The essence 
of the official structuralist definition of "T '  is reducible to T"  is the 
existence of a so-called reduction-relation, which most expediently is 
given as a function 
(s) ~:  M~--+ M~, where Mc~CMF,. 
In general, it is demanded that ,~ is onto and that ~ is a proper subset 
of Mp; ~ it will be indicated in the sequel where these demands are 
employed. Representing reduction relations as functions allows us to 
define images under ~.~ 
e,~[x] := {x'e M~: 3x c M*,~n X (x'-- ,~(x))} 
for every XCMp (i.e., X_C-M~ is not required) and inverse images 
uncaer ,~ 
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:Z~ '[x ' ]  := {x e ~; :  :'#Ixt 9 x'} 
for every X'C_M'p and :~; I (x ' )"= ;f~ l[{x'}] for every x 'c  M~,. Classes 
like these can be used very comfortably to formulate suggestive 
conditions. 
Before turning to more detailed considerations, I would like to 
anticipate a fundamental objection to the structuralist idea. When 
Adams and Sneed speak of the existence of a function ;~ they do not 
mean the mere mathematical sense. Such a function has to meet the 
intuitive requirement that ;~ assigns to every potential model of the 
reducing theory T a potential model of the reduced theory T' which is 
- considered from an external point of view - "'identical with" or 
"composed of the individuals of" the former model. Ascertaining such 
an identity or composition is an empirical matter and afflicted with 
problems that seem to be beyond the reach of a purely formal analysis. 
Accordingly, Adams' and Sneed's formal criteria - just as lhosc 
discussed below - are meant only as necessary conditions for thc 
presence of an intuitive reduction of theories. 4 Speaking of the exis- 
tence of a function ;~ in the sequel, I tacitly assume that this function 
fulfils the intuitive condition just mentioned. ~ Thus I want to avoid 
debating with all those critics who regard the structuralist idea as 
much to() weak and therefore as unacceptable from the outset, 
because the existence of a function as indicated in (s) (with properties 
of the kind discussed below) can concern only questions of cardinality 
- and that is certainly insufficient by far for a genuine reduct ion) 
Now the way is paved for a more exact examination of the criteria 
to be satisfied by reductions and their use in the structuralist approach. 
For this purpose the papers of Tuomela, Niiniluoto, and Hoering that 
argue on a more general level can be kept in the background, which 
leaves us with the essays of Mayr, Pearce, Kamlah, and Mormann. 
These essays are interesting and valuable, but for the most part quite 
complicated, and their presentation obviously mirrors the idiosyncratic 
preferences of the authors. I would like to present heir various efforts 
as an integral whole and leave the dramaturgical structure of the 
criticism unchanged, despite the small loss in systematic stringency. 
The main point is that it is a true, coherent story, told in a simple 
language and thus easy to understand in spite of the considerable 
aberrations and confusions to be overcome. Then the moral of the 
matter will take care of itself. 
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F IRST  ACT:  EXPOSIT ION 
In his trail-blazing article, Adams (1959, pp. 256, 260f) names exactly 
the adequacy conditions of the d-concept of reduction. T' is reducible 
to T only if the following conditions hold: 
(C1) The fundamental concepts of T' are definable 7 in terms of 
the fundamental concepts of T; 
(C2) the fundamental laws of T' are derivable ~from the fun- 
damental laws of T together with the definitions mentioned 
in (C1). 
As Adams emphasizes with reference to Nagel, it is important to note 
that (C 1) has the character of an empirical hypothesis, whereas (C2) is 
a contention which may be decided a priori. This dividing of reduction 
into an "applied" and a "formal" aspect can be recognized in the 
structuralist "analogues" introduced by Adams. They can be expres- 
sed very conveniently by using a suitable function 0% according to (s): 
(C 1 ~) ~[ I ]  _D I'; 
(C2 ~) ?T[M]C_ M'. 
(CP) says that for every intended application of the reduced theory 
there exists a (i.e., at least one) "corresponding" intended application 
of the reducing theory. I cannot agree with Adams' (1959, pp. 260f) 
and Sneed's (1971, p. 217) suggestion that (C1 s) is an exact counter- 
part of (C1). While (C1) presupposes the possibility of a precise 
indication as to how T-applications are constructed out of T'-ap- 
plications, (C1 s) simply implies that corresponding T-applications can 
be found. Again, in (C1) there is no restriction to intended ap- 
plications. Therefore, (CP) is weaker, and one might expect it to be 
called in question in the following. (C2S), stating that T-models may 
only be transformed into T'-models, however, seems to be a very 
faithful image of the basic criterion (C2): the syntactical relation of 
derivability is mirrored by the inclusion relation on the model level, 
where ff takes the r61e of the "mediating" definitions between T' and 
T, and its domain M~ characterizes the range of application of T'. 
Surprisingly it is not (C1 s) but (C2 S) which draws the fire of heavy 
criticism. 9 
There are other criteria which apparently played a r61e in the 
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motivation of the structuralist concept of reduction marked by (s), 
(CI~), and (C2S). Adams (1959, p. 261) considers the following 
(necessary) condition to be the most important for the reduction of T' 
to T: 
((?3) If T is true ("correct"), then T' is true ("correct") as well. 
To judge (C3) we must know what it means for a theory to be true. 
Here is Adams' (1959, p. 260) plausible definition: 
(DI) A theory T=(M, I )  is true (correct) iff IC_M (or 
equivalently, iff I \M = ~). 
Hence, in structuralist wording, (C3) is expressed as follows: 
(C3 S) ICM~ I'CM' (or equivalently, I IM = f J~ I'\M'= ~J). 
Clearly, (C3 ~) is guaranteed by (CI s) and (C22). For from 1C"M it 
follows that ?F[I]C_gF[M] and hence, by (C1 ~) and (C2~), 
l'C_ ~[ l ]C  g~[M]C_ M'. Thus (C3) supports Adams' suggestion. 
Another criterion is to be found in Sneed (1971, p. 218) and 
Stegmiiller (1973, p. 143): 
((?4) Everything that can be explained ("systematized") by T' 
can be explained (systematized) by T as well. 
For the application of this requirement an adequate concept of 
explanation (more generally, of systematization) would have to be 
provided. H' It is not pointed out, however, how this might be fitted 
into the structuralist approach. Sneed and Stegmtiller must be held 
responsible for having advanced a noteworthy criterion which they do 
not know what to make of in this context. At this point, there is no 
(C4~). We shall have to wait until the fifth act. 
Finally, Sneed (1976, p. 139) gives the so-called "preservation 
property" as an additional desideratum. When T' is reducible to T, 
the following condition is said to hold: 
(C5) For every specialization T'~ of T', there is a specialization 
Tt of T such that T'l is reducible to T~ (analogously as T' 
is reducible to T). 
First of all, we recall what a specialization is: 
(D2) T~ = (M~, 1~) is a specialization of T = (M, I) (T~ ~< T) itI 
M1C_M and IIC_I. 
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(D2) is to express that a specialization has more laws and less intended 
applications than the more general theory. 
An obscurity in ((?5) remains, which is due to the fact that the idea 
of this criterion is already made to order to the structuralist instru- 
ments: "analogously" simply means "by the same reduction function 
;~z". Now (C5) may be translated in this way (~ be the usual reduction 
function for T'  and T): 
((?5 ~) VT'~ <~ T':qT, <~ T (,~[I,] D 1'~ & ;~[M, IC_M',). 
Sneed states, and Balzer and Sneed (1978, pp. 188-192) prove, the 
theorem that their reduction concept - a version of (s), ((?1~), and 
(C2 ~) complicated by the use of theoretical terms and constraints - 
satisfies (C5~). That this must be considered as an error is one of the 
main arguments of Mayr's criticism. 
SECOND A( 'T :  MAYR 
Thanks to our simplifying assumptions we are able to give a counter- 
example to (C5 ~) far more easily than Mayr (1976, p. 285). Let T and 
T'  be theories and ~ a reduction function such that ~[M]  ~ M' and 
~[ I ]  = I', and let T'~ = (m'~, I~) = (M'\ ,~[M],  I'). Obviously T~ <~ T', 
but there is no non-empty MtCM with ,(~[M~]CM'I, since 
:T[Mt]C i f [M]  and ZT[M] n M'~ = ~). Therefore, there is no suitable T~ 
for (C5~). Indeed, the M~ in the proof of Balzer and Sneed, which is 
defined as M N ~-I[M'~], is empty in this example. Unfortunately, the 
authors do not seem to have noticed that Mayr essentially had shown 
that in certain cases every M~ appropriate for (C5 ~) must be empty. 
Still, it cannot be desired to save (C5 ~) trivially by employing in- 
consistent "reducing" specializations Tt. For that reason 1 have 
presupposed M to be non-empty in every theory T; moreover,  (C5 ~) 
should be amended by the additional requirement ,~[Mt] 4:0 (the 
signature "(C5~) '' will refer to this improved form in the sequel). 
Accordingly, ((?5) doesn't support the explication of reduction by (s), 
(CI~), and (C2~), which seemed to be so satisfactory. On the contrary, 
it scores a heavy blow against it. 
A second important intuitive argument hat Mayr puts forward is 
this: ~l 
(C6) If T is a specialization of 7" or if T '  is a specialization of 
T, I" and T do not stand in a reduction relation. 
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Even though this form of the criterion will be used, for the sake of 
uniformity we should express the criterion as a necessary condition for 
theories in a reduction relation: 
(C&) TG T '&  "F' ~ T. 
(C6) also presents ome difficulties, but not exactly for the concept of 
reduction characterized by (C1 ~) and (C2~). Nevertheless its discussion 
is instructive. Suppose that T is a specialization of T'. If we would 
consider nothing but the reduction of the theory cores (which are 
identical with the model classes in our simplified theory concept) given 
by (s) and (C2 ~) alone, then T'  would be reducible to T: simply choose 
:~z = idlM ~ (the identity mapping on M~ = Mr,), and evidently :~[M] = 
MC_ M'. Conversely, let T' be a specialization of T; then, according to 
the initial reduction concept of Sneed and Stegmiiller lcf. note 9), 1" 
is reducible to T by idlM,, as well. In this respect at least Adams' old 
version remains immune to Mayr's criticism; it is interesting to check 
why. While the first case (7" -<. T') is disposed of trivially by the help of 
(1 ) ,  in the second case (T '~ T) you might suppose that a suitable 
restriction of id[M,, could establish a reduction. But neither idlr nor 
idl ~ 'uz~ (where ~M is the class complement of M), which are tailored 
to (C 1 ~) and ((72") respectively, optimizing the chances for the other 
criterion, can guarantee the simultaneous satisfaction of both criteria 
(without even mentioning that either M'p couldn't be defined as the 
class of all structures of the same type as the T'-models or one would 
have to give up the requirement hat .'~ is onto). A little sketch ~2 
shows that this is due to the fact that I'\(M'U (s need not be 
empty. ~ It is advisable to take into account not only intended ap- 
plications and models separately, but also combinations of these 
classes. For that purpose the following partition of the class of in- 
tended applications is useful: 
(D3) Let T=(M, I )  be a theory. The elements of IAM are 
called successful applications of T, and elements of I \M are 
called anomalies of T. 
Using these terms, the situation can be formulated in this way: (C61 
constitutes a problem for (C 1 ~) and (C2 ~) if T'  is a specialization of T 
and no successful application of T is at the same time an anomaly of 
T'. As this is not an implausible condition for specializations, one has 
to be aware that (C6) can become dangerous to the Adamsian 
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proposal as well. This seems to have escaped Mayr's notice (but cf. 
(C7) below). 
Before turning to the third and, as far as I can see, last main 
argument of Mayr's criticism, two remarks are in order. Firsl, (C6) 
shows how important it is to understand clearly the ambiguous rSle of 
the domain M~ of 0%. On the one hand, it undertakes the restricting of 
the wider range of application of the reducing theory T, correspond- 
ing to the (non-lawlike) description of the initial conditions in the 
statement view. On the other, M~ also allows smuggling additional 
laws over and above those of T into T' so that the "reduced" theory 
can be much stronger than the "reducing" theory - undoubtedly a
counter-intuitive consequence. One must look for rules concerning 
the specification of M~. Second, (C6) demonstrates that it is indis- 
pensable to think about the relation between specialization - which is 
sometimes regarded as typical for the change within normal science -
and reduction - which is regarded as characteristic of scientific rev- 
olutions. 
Finally, Mayr's last desideratum for reductions is 
(C7) The reducing theory can resolve ("explain") anomalies of 
the reduced theory. 
According to Mayr, this means that there should be successful ap- 
plications of T corresponding to anomalies of T'. Applying (D3) we 
transcribe (C7) into 
(C7 ~) ,?T[/n M] n (r\M') r ~. 
But this is made altogether impossible by the concept of reduction in 
question. For, according to (C2S), .~[M] N q~M' = ~ holds, and since 
~[ I  N M]C_.~[M] and I'\M'C_ ~gM', a fortiori ~[ I  n M] N I ' \M' = ~. 
Mayr does not confine himself to destructive criticism, but offers, 
above all to warrant (C5) and (C7), a constructive counter-proposal. 
His alternative to (C lb  and (C2 s) consists of the following two 
requirements (Mayr 1976, p. 289): 
(CP') ~[t ]=r ,  
(C2 ~') i f [M]  D M'. 
I 'm not sure whether Mayr has noticed that his attempt o replace the 
Sneedian many-many relation t~ by his many-one relation 15 has the 
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result that (C 1 s) is intuitively strengthened to (C 1 s,). It should be noted 
that only this change blocks a violation of Mayr's own criterion (C6), 
since (CP) and (C2 S') allow every specialization T' of T to be reduced 
to T by means of idlM,. ~4 In fact, Mayr's (C2 S') turns out to be 
equivalent o the basic idea (C2 ~*) of the original Sneed-Stegmiiller 
approach (cf. note 9) with which Mayr himself found fault. Next, 
pleading for (C1 ~') and (C2~'), one should correct (C5 ~) in such a way 
that the relation between T~ and T'l is governed by (C1 ~') and (C2 ~') 
as well. Fortunately this new transcription of (C5) is just as guaranteed 
by (CP') and (C2 S') (take M~ := M and I~ := g~ ~[I'~] N I) as the old 
(C5 s) is (take M~ := ~-t[M~] n M and 11 := I). At last, the central 
condition (C2) is no longer ensured by (C2~'), but - on the contrary -
is necessarily violated if (C7) is to have an effect. Mayr failed to see 
this, for he maintained the contrary (1976, pp. 276, 286f). 
Tt t lR I )  A ( 'T :  PEAR( 'H  
At this juncture it cannot be decided which proposal should be 
preferred: that of the first or that of the second act. ~5 Pearce's (1982) 
discussion sheds more light on the situation. We need not give an 
account of his decidedly pro-linguistic tendencies, nor of his strong 
logical apparatus, but can be content with considerations on the model 
level. Pearce (1982, p. 308) chooses a formulation of Stegmiiller's 
(1973, p. 146; English 1976, p. 128) as his starting point. If T' is 
reducible to T it should hold that 
(c8) For every sentence r of T, if ~ is the corresponding 
sentence of T', then r is true only if qJ is true. 
Stegmiiller believes (C8) to be an application oriented paraphrase of 
(C2). The phrase "sentence of T"  - suspiciously sounding like the 
statement view - presents no problems; all what is needed in the 
following is that for any sentence 4~ of T, an extension H4~]IC_Mp (i.e., 
the class of potential models of T in which 4~ holds) can be assigned. 
To be able to judge (C8) completely, we still need  some precise 
structuralist concepts. Pearce (1982, p. 323) represents with very good 
reasons in this context, I think, the truth of a sentence as theory- 
dependent, and he does this in two ways: 
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(D4) A sentence d' of a theory T = (M, I) is called 
(a) true in M iff MCIkbll, 
(b) true in T i f f  M n ICH~b[[. 
Thc interpretation of "the corresponding sentence" in (C8), ap- 
parently presupposing the idea of translatability (and, therefore, 
commensurability?) of the theories in questkm, is a little more deli- 
cate. But if we again confine ourselves to the model level, (C8) seems 
to fit the present frame very well: 
(C8 ~) For every sentence ,;b of T, 
(a) Mc_I]4,I[ ~ M'G~[][4,[I], 
(b) M n tCII611 ~ M' N l 'C ff[ll~bl]]. 
Here the only demand on "the corresponding sentence" qJ mentioned 
in (C8) is that IIq, ll--:~[11611]. Testing this, we could define a "trans- 
lation of T into T' (relative to ,~)" abstractly as a function from 
T-sentences into T'-sentences assigning to every 4, a 4, with the 
property 114,11 = ~[11'/'11]- Why we do not do this, will become clear 
below. 
A confirmed proponent of structuralism will wish to get rid of the 
linguistic remains in (CSS). Forthis purpose, he needn't even suppose 
that every "proposition" of a theory (i.e., every subclass of Mr,) is 
expressible linguistically. The precondition that the class of models, 
and respectively the class of successful applications, of T is definable 
in T is sufficient o show that (C8) can be reformulated without any 
reference to languages. For (C8 s) is then equivalent to 
(C8 ~') (a) ~[M]  _D M', 
(b) ~[MNI ]DM'N I ' .  
To get (C8 ~') (a) from (CSS)(a), simply take a sentence ~b defining the 
class of T-models (i.e., 11611 = M) in (C8~)(a). For the other direction, 
let & be such that MC_[]6ll; hence, .~[M]C_o~[ll4,ll] and, by (C8S')(a), 
also M'C_ ~[114,11]. Case (b) is of course analogous to (a). 
In this way, (C8) would yield two conditions: the Adams-Sneedian 
(C2 s) is inverted to (C2~'), which already was preferred by Mayr, and 
in addition a corresponding condition regarding the successful ap- 
plication emerges: for every successful application of the reduced 
theory at least one successful application of the reducing theory 
corresponds (via the reduction function ~). 
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Unfortunately this result cannot be maintained in its whole sim- 
plicity. As the reducing theory always is supposed to have a greater 
expressive power and to allow linguistic distinctions which are not 
reproducible in the reduced theory, the foregoing idea cannot be an 
intuitively adequate explication of translation. "The corresponding 
sentence" 4`, presupposed by (C8), does not exist at all. Consequently, 
the direction of the translation as defined by Pearce (1982, p. 314) is 
exactly the other way round. Thus we define: 
(D5) Let the theory T' = (M', I') be reduced to the theory T = 
(M, I) by a suitable function ~. 
(a) A sentence & of T is called a translation of the sentence 
of T' (relative to o~) iff 114~11 = ~ '[114` 11]- 
(b) A function .~ of T'-sentences into T-sentences is 
called a translation of T' into T (relative to ~7") iff for 
every T'-sentence 4  `S(4`) is a translation of 4  `(relative 
to ~).16 
The following is a plausible consequence of (D5): if a translation :Y of 
T' into T exists, then all potential models x and y of T that are 
mapped onto the same potential model of T' cannot be distinguished 
by translations of T'-sentences, i.e., ;~(x)=,~(y) implies x e 
[[ .T(4`)]] r y c [] ,~(4`)[[ for every sentence 4  `of T'. 
This change brings it about that (C8 s) is replaced by 
(c8% For every sentence 4  `of T', 
(a) MC_ ~-'[l[4`ll] ~ M'c-II4`ll, 
(b) M D IC_ o~-'[114`11] ~ M' O I'C_ll4`ll. 
The linguistically inspired conditions (C8 S') are no longer equivalent 
to the simple inclusions (C8"~'). (C8 ~') gives only suflicienL but not 
necessary conditions for (C8~"). Let us consider case (a) once more. 
On the one hand, (C8 ~') is sufficient: from MC~ 1[114` 11 ] it follows that 
~[MJC_~[~-'[l14`llllc_l1011 and, by (C8%, M'C_H4`II follows. On the 
other, (C8 s') would only be necessary on making two implausible 
assumptions. Assume firstly that ~[M]  can be defined in T', i.e., that 
there is a T'-sentence 4  `with 114,11 = ~[M3, then the consequent of 
(C8 ~'') is identical with (C8S'); but the antecedent of (C8~"), viz., 
MC_~-~[~[M]], would be valid only if we assumed secondly that 
MC_ M~p (note that (C8 ~') is satisfied trivially if M ~/V~p!). But since the 
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first assumption is rather strong and the second even is undesirable, 
one mustn't consider (C8 ~') and (C8 ~'') to be equivalent, 
Nevertheless, Mayr's condition (C2 ~') is supported by Pearce in a 
completely independent way. Whichever criterion is fawmred - (C2 ~) 
or (C2 ~') - it seems that Stegmiiller's intuitions concerning the 
adequacy condition (C8) for reductions have to be corrected twice: 
first, (C8) is not formulated accurately enough - the translation must 
go in the opposite direction. And second, as pointed out by Pearce 
(1982, p. 328), (C8) is far from being equivalent to (C2). 
It finally remains to state that Pearce (1982, p. 236) regards Mayr's 
(C1 s') as too strong and upholds (C1 s) again. He adds (C8~')(b) as a 
third condition which derives from (C8) just as (C2 ~') does. (C8~')(b) 
does not follow from the other conditions, which say thai a successful 
application x' of T' must have a corresponding intended application 
x~ c I and a corresponding model x2 c M, but x~ = x2 need not hold. It 
should be noted, however, that (C8~')(b) also isn't able to prevent hat 
every specialization T' of T can be trivially reduced to its general 
theory T by id[~,, if Pearce's proposal is adopted. As the more 
informative, hence better theory is reducible to the weaker one then, 
(C6) is violated in its critical direction. 
FOURTH ACT:  KAMLAH 
Kamlah's essay also can be made to suit the present frame, without 
any individual characteristics and without his treatment of ap- 
proximations. Starting out from a quotation of Hempel (1965, p. 344), 
which says that the reducing theory implies the laws of the reduced 
theory only within a limited range, 17 Kamlah's argumentation is to the 
effect that not the laws (as in (C2)) but the empirical claims of the 
theories are put into a consequence r lation. Thus, if T' is reducible to 
T, it should hold that 
(C9) The empirical claim of T' follows from the empirical claim 
of T. 
In our condensed theory concept, the empirical claim of a given 
theory T is simply equated with the truth condition for T mentioned 
in (DI), viz., IC_M. On the model level this meta-theoretical 
requirement is reflected by the "proposition" of the potential models 
"allowed" by T, i.e., <gl U M. Accordingly, (C9) can be made precise 
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in the following structuralist way (cf. Kamlah's (C I )  and (1) in 1985, 
pp. 135f): 
(C9 ~) ?T[~,qI U M]C ~I' U M'. 
First of all, the connection with the related criterion (C3) is interes- 
ting: if we presuppose that ~ is onto (recall that this is a usual 
stipulation), (C9 ~) implies (C3~): from I \M- -~ we get, by (C9~), 
/~[Mp]C ~I'  U M', and therefore, since ~ is onto, I ' \M' = ~. 
We can express (C9 ~) also as a criterion concerning anomalies. 
Indeed, it is equivalent to I \MD~- I [ I ' \M ' ] ,  18 i.e., it says: any 
anomaly of the reduced theory has only anomalous correlates in the 
reducing theory. Now, it is clear that (C9) is in contradiction with 
(C7). From (C9"), we have, on account of I N MCMC~I  U M, .~[I n 
M]C '(,I' U M', which is tantamount to ,~[I N M] n ( I ' \M ' )= r 
Furthermore, Kamlah demands a counterpart to (Clt  in his final 
definition of reduction (1985, p. 138): 
(('1 ~'') 1 D:~ i[ l ,].~ 
Assuming again that ,~ is onto, (C1 ~'') entails :~[I] _D ~[ ;~ 1[I']] = I', 
i.e., (CI~). However, (C1 ~) does by no means warrant (CI~"); this 
would be the case only if I D ;~ t[/~,~[l]] were true - but for this :~ 
would also have to be a function (at least on .~[I]) what is generally 
demed. ~4 For that reason (C1 ~'') is in effect stronger than (CI~), and 
consequently more difficult to justify. Kamlah's own remarks pertinent 
to (C 1 ~'') are certainly not satisfactory. 
It is interesting that Kamlah's conditions (CI~") and (C9 ~) can be 
substantiated by Adams' (C 1 ~) and (C2~), if one accepts an additional 
assumption looking far less objectionable than (C1 ~") (in fact, it 
follows from (CP")). I think it perfectly possible to determine an 
intuitive reduction function such that, for every intended application 
of the reduced theory, the inverse images all turn out to be either 
intended applications, or to be no intended applications of the reduc- 
ing theory. 21 The additional assumption reads thus: 
(At Vx 'c  I'(:~ ' (x ' )C lv  ~ '(x')C_(~/). 
With the help of (A), (CP) implies (CP"): if, for every x 'c  1', there is 
at least one x c I with ~:(x) = x', then, by (A), even ,,~-l(x')CI, and 
we have (CP"). 
More important is that Kamlah's (C9 s) is deducible from Adams' 
244 t lANg R o ' r ' r  
conditions together with (A). Let x c %q U M; we have to show that 
.@(x)c ~ I 'U  M' (if x~ M~g). First case: x c M; but then ,~(x)~ 
M'C%7'U M', by (C2~), and we are done. Second case: x r  ~I ;  
suppose that ~(x) were not an element of ~ I 'U  M', i.e., ;~(x)c 
I'\M'C_I'; but then, by (C1 ~'') which is already verified, we have 
.~ ~(ff(x))C I, contradicting x c '~I, and (C9 ~) is proven. 
Hence, if one is ready to accept (A), (C9 ~) cannot express interes- 
ting properties beyond those of the Adamsian proposal. As, on the 
other hand, (C2 ~) is not derivable from (C1 ~'') and (C9~), Kamlah's 
idea ends in a genuine liberalization of the original concept of reduc- 
tion - a liberalization strong enough, however, to be still contradictory 
to the criterion (C7), 
Let us return to Kamlah's innovation (C9). The underlying idea is 
anticipated very exactly in the last part of Niiniluoto's (1980, p. 36) 
rewording of the Sneed-StegmiJller definition of reduction; he for- 
mulates as definiens: 
there is a many-one relation R from M~,I, to Mpp [our 5 z 1] such that the intended 
applications of T' are correlated with intended applications of 7' and what T' says about 
these applications is entailed by what T says about he corresponding applications, [my 
italics] 
The difference between (C2 ~) and (C9 '~) seems to have escaped 
Niiniluoto's notice. But if you search for the source of this inaccuracy, 
you will come across similar sentences in Sneed (1971, p. 218, 11.6-3 
from the bottom; 1976, p. 136, II. 18-22), Balzer and Sneed (1977, p. 
202, 11. 8-5 from the bottom), and Stegmuller (1979, p. 36, 11.23-25), 
which are much more puzzling than that of Niiniluoto. Let me quote 
Balzer and Sneed as an example 
(c 10) everything the reduced theory says about a given ap- 
plication is entailed by what the reducing theory says about 
any corresponding application. 
Except for the fact that in Sneed's full theory model a theory says 
nothing about a single application (this is due to the constraints), the 
formulation of (C10) presupposes at least 22 the following (because the 
reducing theory mustn't state different things about different cor- 
responding applications): 
(A') Vx 'c  I ' (YT-t(x')GMv ,~-t(x')C ~M). 
I am in doubt whether this is a desirable additional assumption. 23But 
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let us take (A') for granted. Then, (C10t can be made precise, I think, 
in at least three different ways: 
(CI0 ~) Vx '~ l ' ( (~  l ( x ' )CM~x'~M' )& 
& (:~ ~(x')C ~r ~ x' c M')). 
(C10% Vx 'e I ' (~- l (x ' )CM~x'cM' ) .  
(CI0 ~') Vx 'c  I ' ( (~-~(x ' )CM~ x'e M')& 
& (:~ ~tx')C_~r x'E ~M')). 
(C10 S) agrees best with the structuralist account that the empirical 
claim of T' = (M', I') is 1'C M', i.e., that for every x' c l', T' can only 
"say" that x' c M'. (C10") strengthens this idea by requiring that every 
intended application of T' has to be a model "in the light of the 
reducing theory T"  as well, i.e., that for every x' ~ I', T, too, can only 
W I' "say" that ~ ~(x')C_ M. (C l (  ), however, allows that some x 'c  are 
no models "in the light of T",  and moreover interprets (C10) in such 
a way that 7 . . . .  says the same" about those x', viz. x ' r  M'. Thus 
(C10 TM) violates the prescipt hat I 'CM'  be the empirical claim of T'. 
Perhaps this can be justified by the fact that open-minded T'- 
theoreticians are quite willing to acknowledge that a certain portion of 
the intended applications I' consists of anomalies, and to cease from 
contending that all elements of 1' are elements of M' as well. 
Be that as it may, none of the above-mentioned conditions makes 
clear at first glance that the protagonists of structuralism almost 
always have in mind the Adamsian condition (C2 ~) (but cf. notes 9 and 
15; (C1 ~) is treated as an extra requirement). A second glance I am 
going to take at (C10~)-(CI0 S') will indeed reveal that (CI0) is not 
suitable for establishing (C2"). 
Our most faithful transcription plainly cannot be a criterion for an 
interesting inter-theoretical relation between T and T'. Due to (A'), 
one of the antecedents is always satisfied, and (C10 S) is simply 
equi, valent to the "empirical claim" of T', viz., I 'CM' .  
The second version of (C10) is weaker and doesn't lead to (C2) 
either, but surprisingly to (C9~): 
(C10% r Vx 'c  I '(~ Mv x' ~ M') 
r Vx' ~ I' (~  l(x')C_ ~M v x' ~ M') (by (A')) 
r162 Vx' c I' ( x' q~ W[M]v x 'e  M') 
I' CM'U  ~[M]  
r n ~[M]c_ M' 
r (C9 ~) (el. note 197. 
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Likewise the third reading - though stronger than (C9") - is not 
sufficient for (C2~). We once more presuppose that .~ is onto in the 
following: 
(CIO ~'') r I'f-) ~[M]C_M'& l'fq .~[~M]C_~M' 
r I '  N 2T[M]C M' & I '  7 /~f f [M]C  :(,TM' 
(just as in (C10~')) 
(by (A') and ~s  
being onto) 
r I' N gT[M]CM' & I' O M'C.~[M] 
r I' N ~[ M]= I' fq M'. 
This condition determines I'r more exactly than (CI(P'). 
Roughly, (C10 ~'') says that T and 7" mark out the "same" models 
relative to the applications intended for T'. Outside I', however, there 
is no demand on the relation between :~[M] and M'. 
Now we have seen that the more prominent structuralists were not 
fully aware of the differences between absolute and application- 
relative criteria for the class of models. But unfortunately, Kamlah's 
(1985, p. 140) own comparison of his approach with that of Adams 
and Sneed is no great help either. First of all, he apparently considers 
(C1 ~'') as equivalent to (CI ~) - an error, as we have seen. More 
important, the sole argument he advances against (C2 ~) is no counter- 
argument at all: the existence of 7"-models that "contradict" the 
"'mathematical parts" of T, i.e., that have at most T-nonmodels as 
inverse images under :~, is of course perfectly compatible with (C2~). 
And trying to make use of Kamlah's idea by changing the r61es of T 
and T', one only faces a problem if one presupposes, like Kamlah 
(1985, p. 133), that /~: -  Mp - but usually this is explicitly denied. 
F IFTt t  ACT:  MORMANN 
The last part of the criticism of the structuralism concept of reduction 
is contributed by Mormann. itis starting point is a consideration of 
intuitive adequacy conditions for reductions, and he is the first to 
discover a (exactly one) contradiclion. One of his four criteria is new 
to us, and finally the concept of explanation enters the stage. Promp- 
ted by a passage of Sneed (1976, pp. 138f) and Balzer and Sneed 
(1977, p. 204), Mormann (1984, p. 14) formulates a novel criterion he 
calls "the condition of the potential tightening of explanations": 
(C1 l) Not all explanations of T'  remain valid in the light of 7'. 
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(C11) is to interpret the intuitive requirement that T be a better 
theory giving more accurate explanations than T'. The concept of 
explanation proposed by Mormann (1984, p. 15) is the following (the 
term "explanation" admittedly sounds more apl~ropriate when the full 
Sneedian machinery is used): 
(D6) Let T= (M, I) be a theory. 
(a) A potential model x ~ M e is said to be explained hy 7" 
iff x c M;  
(b) an intended application x e I is said to be explained by 
T i f f  xcM.  
Depending on whether (a) or (b) is preferred, explanations of T can 
simply be equated with (sets of) models or (sets of) successful ap- 
plications of T. Mormann's usage varies a little, and we shall therefore 
9 3 4 follow both variants. ~ The explication suggested by Mormann enables 
us to rewrite (C 11) in a structuralist manner: 
(D7) An explanation E 'CM' (N  I') of T' is called valid in the light 
of T i f f  there is an EC_M with 5Z[E] = U. 
Obviously, the definiens of (DT) is equivalent o 2~[M]D E' (take 
E := :~-I[E'] N M). And the quantification i  (C11) can be dispensed 
with if the "maximal exp.lanation" of T', viz., M'(N I'), is used. Thus 
the two reformulations of (C11) are 
(CI1 ~) :~[ M] ~ M', 
(CI I  ~') ~[M]~M'NI ' .  
(C I I  ~) indeed is the condition of the passages of Sneed and 
Balzer/Sneed mentioned; the stronger condition (C11"~'), however, is 
new. I do not regard (D7) as the most natural definition and would 
rather propose a more obvious alternative. As we refrain from using 
constraints, it is sufficient to consider explanations point by point 
instead of collecting them into sets. 
(D7') An explanation x' r M' (or x' c M' N I') is called valid in the 
light of T i f f  there is an explanation x c M (resp., x E M n 
I) of T with ?~(x) = x'. 
There is no change if the interpretation of (C l l )  is based on (D6)(a), 
but (C l l  ~') is weakened to a third version of (CI1) if (D6)(b) - which 
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presumably fits the intuition better - is applied: 
(CII ~'') ;~[MNI ]~M'N I ' .  
Even the nonformal wording of (C l l )  makes it evident that this 
criterion is inconsistent with (C4). According to our "double entry" in 
(D6), (C4) is now easily transformed into these inclusions: 
(C4 ~) i f [M] D M', 
(C&') g,~[M n I] D M' n I'. 
As was to be expected, (C4 ~) and (C4 ~') are negations of (C11 ~) and 
(CI 1~"). A more interesting observation is that the two versions of 
(C4) already have found quite independent support: (C4 s) turns out to 
be the Mayr-Pearcean condition (C2~'), and (C4 ~') exactly is the 
Pearcean supplementary condition (C8~')(b). In this respect, (C4) 
surprisingly provides the critics of Adams and Sneed with arguments, 
while (C l l )  works in their defence. But note that the strongest 
interpretation of (C11), i.e., Mormann's (C 11~'), is in contradiction to 
the strongest interpretation of the Balzer-Sneed condition (C 10), i.e., 
my (C 10s"). 
Mormann thinks that he ca~ resolve the inconsistency of (C11 ~) 
(and (CI 1~')) with (C2~'). For this purpose he extensively draws on 
constraints, so his attempt is beyond the purview of this paper. The 
present diagnosis is far more critical than his one anyhow. 
THE MORAL 
Perhaps it is not enough to make a well-knit dramatic play out of five 
short stories. The reader may have failed to. keep track of the 
d6nouement. We had criteria for intended applications ((C1)), for 
models ((C2), versions of (C4), (C8), and (Cl l)) ,  for intended ap- 
plications and models ((C5) and (C6)), for anomalies ((C3), (C9), and 
a version of (C10)), for successful applications (versions of (C4), (C8), 
(CI0), and (C 11)) and for anomalies and successful applications 
((C7)). Let us make the structure of the plot somewhat more trans- 
parent. 
THEOREM 1 (implications). 
(a) (C1 s') ::~ (ClS), (C1 *') r (C1 s) & (A); 
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(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(C P") & (C2 ~) ~ (C9 ~) ~ (C3S); 
(CP) & (C2 s') r (C5S); 
(C2 ~') r (C4 s) ~ (C8S')(a)~ (C8~")(a); 
(C4 ~') r (cas')(b) ~ (C8~")(b); 
(C10 ~'') ~ (C10 s') <=> (C9~); 
(C1P') @ (C1 1~), (C1P') @ (C1 1~"); 
(CS~')(b) & (C9 ~) ~ (C 1~). 
This list is, as far as I can see, complete. The criteria not mentioned or 
not interwoven here come into effect in the next theorem, which can 
be extended with the help of theorem 1. Note especially the somehow 
complementary 61es of (C7) and (C 1 1) in the criticism of the Adams- 
Sneedian and the Mayr-Pearcean proposals respectively. 
THEOREM 2 (incompatibilities). The following pairs are logically 
incompatible: 
(a) (C2~) - (C7~); 
(b) (C2 ~') - (C 1 1 s) (or equivalently, (C4 ~) - (CI IS)); 
(c) (C6~)- (C1 S) & (C2 s') (& (C8S')(b)); 
(d) (C8~')(b) - (C1 1 s'') (or equivalently, (C4 ~') - (C 1 1~")); 
(e) (C9 ~) - (C7~); 
(f) (c 10s")- (c lr");  
the following pair is practically incompatible: 
(g) (C3 s) - (C7  S) (since it necessitates I~  M). 
Those who, like myself, think that the criticisms of the structuralist 
concept of reduction advanced by Mayr, Pearce, Kamlah, and Mor- 
mann all have some plausibility may try to replace the Adams- 
Sneedian criteria by a new approach. On the one hand, (C1 ~s)) can be 
given up without any loss, since - prima facie - not every intended 
application of T' must have an o~-correlate: at first one is not at all 
anxious for the anomalies of T' to be mirrored in T. On the other 
hand, one need not insist on (C2 ~s)) if the (artificial?) separation of the 
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applied and the formal aspect of a theory is rescinded: ~'5 instead of the 
laws, the empirical claims - as suggested by Kamlah - are required to 
stand in an entailment relation. Accordingly, let us combine (C9 ~) with 
the quite efficient basic criterion (C2 ~') favoured by Mayr and Pearce: 
(C12) M'C_,~[M]C~[~glU M]CcgI'U M'. 
The second inclusion is of course trivial. For illustration I once again 
add what mustn't happen concerning the models and anomalies if 
(C12) is operative: first, no T-model is allowed to represent a T'- 
anomaly by means of ~ (if this were the case, then remove the 
T-model in question from M~v~), and second, the inverse image of a 
T'-model mustn't consist of T-anomalies only. 
As (C1 1 ~'') seems to be the best reading of (C1 l), the inconsistency 
of (C12) with Mormann's (C1 1 ~) (and (CllS')) is not very annoying. 
But we also know that (C12) is incompatible with Mayr's idea of the 
"explanation of T'-anomalies by T".  After verifying the existence of 
an intuitively convincing function ~ obeying (C12), however, it is 
possible to investigate whether there are some "/"-anomalies x' c I'\M' 
that have T-counterparts in (I N M)\M~. If this test proves positive 
then, in a second reduction step, enlarge M~ suitably so that a function 
~* is formed which satisfies (C7 ~) (but, of course, no longer (C12)). 2~ 
Thus we have managed to furnish a round dozen of criteria, but I 
must confess that even this last two-stage plan to save the structuralist 
concept of reduction doesn't seem watertight o me. Anyhow, every 
variation of Adams' conditions loses the so simple and clear idea of 
the old empiricist definability-cum-derivability concept. For that 
reason I am inclined to draw entirely different conclusions in the case 
of reduction from the above discussion. 
After all we have a result: the (necessary) conditions of adequacy 
proposed by the various parties are incompatible. On visualizing that 
in truely progressive reductions we have to expect c (or ~) instead of 
C (or _D), it becomes evident that not even (C2 ~) and (C2 s') are 
compatible. With the exception of Mormann's essay, 1 have found no 
indication of this problem in the literature. 27 One can only speculate 
as to why there is so little awareness here. For one thing, the continual 
changes in presentation (notations and conventions) are impeding the 
immediate grasp of the matter. For another, the technical expenditure 
caused by constraints and the distinction of partial and full potential 
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models is adding to the embarrassing state of affairs. Though well- 
founded as such, constraints and theoretical functions would seem 
superfluous especially for the discussion of reduction. 2s Perhaps my 
result was obtained with so small an effort only because 1 confined 
myself to the simple theory model of Adams and formulated the 
criteria as relations between (inverse) image classes that are easy to 
handle. But this is no explanation for the fact that specialists have 
given distorted 2' or even false 3~ pictures of the interrelations. That 
leads us to assume that the concept of reduction in its structuralist 
appearance is based on too immature intuitions; that all criteria arc 
legitimate in one way or the other, but are nothing but an expression 
of a family resemblance of the relations between replaced and replac- 
ing theories; in short, that we have to look for a new pattern for the 
rational reconstruction of theory dislodgement. 
For fear this paper might look too destructive, I would like to sketch 
briefly what pattern I have in mind. I think it is quite possible to revive 
the d-concept of reduction, at once retaining its intuitive appeal and 
repairing its shortcomings. The discussion reviewed above indeed is 
somewhat fictitious, since T'  is generally in only approximate 
agreement with T, even within its own range of application, i.e., 
strictly speaking, T '  is inconsistent with T. This is the first and 
foremost of the two challenges of Feyerabend. 31In order to solve this 
problem philosophers of science used to replace T'  or T in (d) by 
approximate, and respectively extended, "'versions" T'* or T*. Such a 
procedure is plausible but not very instructive. I consider it better to 
make a transition from (d) to 
(d*) T*  ~- T', 
where T* is a revision of T needed to accept A, in the sense of 
Gi~rdenfors and his collaborators. 32This term refers to a process of 
theory change which has recently been developed for the semantics of 
(counterfactual) conditionals and can be described rather construc- 
tively. It allows A to designate contrary-to-fact onditions (i.e., con- 
ditions contrary to what T says is a fact), 33 and hence T and T'  to be 
inconsistent. Of course, (d*) must first prove useful in case studies, and 
then it must show how we can get out of the di lemma when-to-apply- 
which-criteria-for-what-reasons. 
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NOTES 
* I wish to thank David Pearce for enlightening criticism and Winfred Klink for 
correcting my English. 
i Cf. for instance Tuomela (1978, pp. 222f), Niiniluoto (1980, p. 25), Pearce (1981, pp. 
24f, 29f; 1982, p. 330). Even in Stegmiiller (1979, pp. 48, 870 similar remarks can be 
found. 
2 These are not the original assumptions, but amendments first suggested by Rantala. 
Cf. Niiniluoto (1980, pp. 9-11), Pearce (1982, pp. 312f) and the programmatic essay of 
Pearce and Rantala (1983), where in particular the terms "similarity type" and "general 
logic" are explained. 
3 For motivation, see e.g. Stegmiiller (1973, p. 145). In Adams (1959) both conditions 
still are absent; in Sneed (1971, p. 221) ~ is not required to be onto, but in Sneed (1976, 
pp. 122, 136f) it is. Kamlah (1985, p. 133) stipulates that M~ = Mp, but not that ;~ be 
onto. In the applications of Pearce and Rantala both requirements appear, but aiways 
without he index "p", cf. e.g. Pearce and Rantala (1984, pp. 171f). 
4 Cf. Adams (1959, pp. 261f) and Sneed (1971, pp. 231f); more general remarks are 
made by Stegmiiller (1979, pp. 42f). 
A protection against excessive humbuggery with arbitrary reduction functions ~ is 
provided by the formal requirements that .~k z is to map M~ onto M'p and that this M'~, be 
definable as the class of all structures of type r - Mormann (1984, pp. 45-48) indicates 
a more interesting structuralist explication of the intuitive requirement. 
~' Cf. Mayr (1976, pp. 286f), Tuomela (1978, pp. 220, 226) and particularly Hoering 
(1984, pp. 37-39). Hoering's (1984, pp. 35f) discussion of Eberle's (1971) syntactic 
approach is a warning that the statement view is exposed to quite the same dangers. 
7 Formulations are varying here: Adams (1959, p. 260) uses the term "define", Sneed 
(1971, p. 217) "'correspondence", and Stegmiiller (1976, p. 128) "transpose". 
8 Adams (1959, p. 261) says "'derive", Sneed (1971, p. 220) "deduce", and Stegmiiller 
(1976, p. 128) "map". 
'~ The credit goes to Mayr for having pointed out the fact that Sneed (1971, p. 229) and 
Stegmiiller (1973, p. 151) originally did not propose (C2~), but 
(C2 ~*) VO :P N'C_M'3NCM(O ~: .@[N]c N') 
as a criterion for the reduction of theories ("theory elements" as they were to call it 
later). The conditions that N' and 3~[N] be non-empty presumably are intended by 
Sneed and Stegmiiller and have been added by me. Otherwise, (C2 S*) would be 
completely trivial (simply take NC M~A,~,). Mayr's theorems 2.7 and 2.8 (1976, pp. 284, 
286), according to which (C2 ~*) would be stronger than (C29, are not correct; however, 
the proofs show that (C2 S*) is equivalent to ~[M] D M'  - a curious result, in the light of 
the following discussion! In Sneed (1976, pp. 137f) and Stegmiiller (1979, p. 96) you can 
find (more complicated versions of) (C2 S) as a criterion. I wonder why neither Sneed nor 
Stegmtiller commented on their - certainly considerable - change of mind (or on Mayr's 
pertinent observations). 
~' Tuomela (1978, pp. 220f) thinks that the concept of reduction can only be analyzed 
by the concept of explanation. In contrast, Kamlah (1985, pp. 124f) is of the opinion 
that (C4) points to an alternative explicandum. 
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~t For motivation, see Mayr (1976, pp. 279f, 287). 
~-" T 
.~: - - id [?  
) 
Sketches like these are very useful in testing criteria 
T' 
but note that in general M ~ ~ Mp). 
~ Yet, it is conceivable that the rule of autodetermination (cf. StegmiJller 1973, pp. 
224-231) is effective in the construction of specializations. Then (C6) definitely speaks 
against he concept of reduction according to (CV) and (C2"). 
H The substitution of (CI") for (C1 s) is not efficient if (C2 ~) is the second requirement; 
an ff satisfying (CV) and (C2 ~) could be turned into a reduction function satisfying 
(CI") by restricting the domain of ,@ to g~- ~[I']. But cf. note 5. 
~ Balzer (1982, p. 298) uses (C2 ~) and (C2 ~') not in competition, but in combination. 
The identity :T[M] = M' is also implied by the introduction of ff  in the papers of Pearce 
and Rantala (cf. note 3), who now regard this situation as characteristic for only one 
type of reduction they call "embedding".  
~6 Pearce (1981, p. 25; 1982, p. 314) and Balzer (1982, p. 220) proceed in a more 
abstract manner and call ,~Y itself a translation of T' into T iff for every T' -sentence ~, 
there is a translation of + (relative to :~-). 
t7 This quotation already can almost literally be found in Kemeny and Oppenheim 
(1956, p. 13), who, however, thank Hempel for his clarifying remarks in a footnote to 
the pertinent paragraph. 
~s It is easy to show that this condition - let us call it (C9 ~') - is equivalent to (C9"): 
(C9~)::>(C9~'): Let xr  i.e., ?~(x)c l ' \M '=To(~l 'UM' ) ,  
hence, by (C9s), x 9~ ~r U M, i.e., x ~ I \M.  
(('9~')=>(C9~): Let x 'e ,~ i.e., there is an xc~IOM with 
,~(x )=x ', hence 3~ I(x')r  I \M,  hence, by (C9~'), x'~ I ' \M' ,  i.e., x ' c  
~(4I' U M'. 
"' (CI ~'') is intuitively required by Balzer and Sneed (1977, pp. 202[), too; in the 
subsequent definition, however, they choose (C10. - Kamlah (1985, pp. 136-138) needs 
(C1 ~') as a premise to show the equivalence of (C9 ~) with the condition I 'A  5~[M]C_ M' 
- let us call it (C9~"). As an illustration how very frightening-looking theorems and 
derivations hrink to moderate proportions in the simple theory model, here is a small 
proof of this equivalence: 
(C9 ~) ~ (C9~"): Let x 'e  I' f3 ~[M] ;  hence, there is an x e M with ,~ - 
x', and thus, by (C9~), x' c ~I '  U M' and, since x' e I', also x' e M'. 
(C9 ~'') ~ (C90:  Let x' c ~:[C~l U M]; hence, there is an x e ~I  U M with 
,@(x) = x'; if x e ~I ,  then, by (CI~"), also x' = 5~(x) e q~l'; if on the other 
hand x e M, then, by (C9~"), x' = .~:(x) e q~l' U M'. 
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2. If (C2 ~) or (C9 ~) (but not (C2~')) is to be the second condition, one can get (C P") 
from (CI ')  by taking ~1~ instead of ,~. But cf. note 5. 
eL For instance, this is already ensured if there is a translation r from T' into T (relative 
to ,~) and a T' -sentence tO with ][r(tO)JJ = I, i.e., roughly speaking, if the class of intended 
applications of T (within M~) is definable in T'. 
22 Sneed's formulation of 1971 presupposes even more, namely that ~z , is a function. 
2~ I don't believe that (A') can be justified by the argument mentioned in note 21, since 
the class of T-models (within ~)  presumably cannot be defined in T'. But (A') 
sometimes may be guaranteed by the formal trick of choosing (with the help of the 
axiom of choice) one x(x')  c I with ~(x(x ' ) )  = x' for every x' ~ I' (such an x(x') exists by 
(CI~)), and then using ~[l~,x'~: xcn instead of ft. But cf. note 5. 
24 It seems to me, however, that (b) is fractionally better. Considering the class of 
potential models not explained by T, (a) suggests this class to be ~,,'M, whereas (b) 
suggests it to be the class of anomalies l \M .  It is the latter that hits the common usage 
more precisely. 
:s This separation also is removed in Niiniluoto's (1980, pp. 26f) minimal trans- 
formation of the non-statement view into the statement view, replacing a structure 
(M, I) by the statement "Every I is an M". 
~6 But cf. note 5. 
27 Hoering's (1984, pp. 47f) suspicion that the "requirements of dcfinability and 
derivability" ((CI) and (C2)) must sometimes be weakened in order to aw~id in- 
consistencies is certainly not relevant here. He mentions approximations and 
undefinabilities of theoretical functions as possible reasons, aspects ! have left out of 
consideration i  this paper. 
:s For instance, you do not learn anything substantial about reductions from the 
reflections in Sneed (1971, pp. 224f), but only about some technical problems of his 
sophisticated theory model. - However, Mormann thinks that his inconsistency (of. 
theorem 2(b)) can be overcome just by a massive employment of constraints. Thus he 
modifies the structuralist readings of (C8) and (C5). But 1 suspect hat if even one single 
criterion is modified then consequently every other criterion must be modified too - e.g., 
with reference to M f-) C for a maximal constraint C (cf. Mormann 1984, p. 30) and 
therefore the problems will reappear in an analogous way. 
29 Pearce's reference to Stegmiiller's (C8) is, as seen above, not quite accurate. Besides, 
1 wasn't able to verify Pearce's (1982, pp. 309, 323) contention that Mayr bases his 
criticism of the Adams-Sneed concept on that very criterion (C8). Hoering's (1984. pp. 
38f) recapitulation of Pearce (in fact, it is a recapitulation of Pearce's recapitualtion of 
Sneed - Pearce himself avours different criteria) could be mentioned here or in the next 
note; his first " theorem" is certainly not correct. 
30 1 have mentioned Stegmiiller (1973, p. 146), Sneed (1976, p. 139), Mayr (1976, pp. 
276, 284, 286f), and Kamlah (1985, p. 140). 
Sl Checking the central passages on meaning variance and incommensurabil ity n (the 
earlier) Feyerabend's work, you will find good reasons for saying that the source of 
(Feyerabend's) incommensurabil ity is inconsistency. This has been paid far too little 
attention up to now, I think. Cf. Feyerabend (1962, pp. 57, 59, 74f, 81f) and (1963, p. 
30). 
3z As a first information, see Makinson (1985). A comprehensive treatise by Gardenfors 
(1987), summing up and developing all pertinent work further, is in preparation. 
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33 Cf. Glymour (1970), esp. p. 341: "lntcr-theoretical explanation is an exercisc in the 
presentation f countcrfactuals." 
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